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I. INTRODUCTION
Independently developed in the twentieth century, quantum mechanics and information theory have been combined and led to several intriguing applications. In particular, there have been significant experimental advances in QKD, successfully implemented and deployed in the field by several research groups and companies [1] . The significance of QKD is in offering unconditional security even against an adversary who tampers with the legitimate users' measurement devices [2] . Two pioneering papers on QKD [3, 4] discovered that by non-classical signaling between two parties (Alice and Bob), the laws of quantum mechanics bound the adversary's (Eve's) information, which combined with classical informationtheoretic tools, such as information reconciliation and privacy amplification, can lead to the establishment of secure key bits. The security proofs of QKD have evolved [5] from considering simple attacks, in which Eve could only perform a measurement on each transmitted signal and send another state to Bob, to account for all attacks that could be described in the framework of quantum mechanics, known as coherent attacks.
Although QKD ensures the confidentiality of the generated keys in an extremely strong sense, Alice and Bob might desire other security features. One such feature that recently attracted attention is covertness [6] [7] [8] , i.e., the ability to prevent an adversary to distinguish whether a communication protocol is running or not from its observations. Considering a memory-less classical or classical-quantum channel, over which Alice aims at sending a message, a square root law has been established [6, 9] , which states that the optimal number of bits that could be reliably and covertly transmitted scales as the square root of the number of channel uses. This contrasts with the limits of confidential communication, for which linear scaling is feasible. The main intuition behind the square root law is that the central limit theorem ensures the presence of statistical uncertainty in Eve's observations on the order of the square of the * Author to whom correspondence should be addressed. Email: mtahmasbi3@gatech.edu † Email: matthieu.bloch@ece.gatech.edu number of channel uses.
For covert communication, Alice and Bob might need a secret key prior to the communication, which makes the problem of covert key generation interesting. In [10] , covert QKD was considered, in which covertness is achieved through sharing the position of a secret subset of channel uses and running QKD only over those positions. As noted in [10] , the number of required bits to identify the positions asymptotically dominates the number of generated bits. In [11] , we proposed an alternative coding scheme for covert QKD based on sparse signaling and an information-theoretic technique called likelihood encoder [12] , which circumvents the key consuming process of sharing the positions for communication by diffusing information in every channel use. The weakness of our result is that there is no obvious efficient implementation of the proposed protocol. We present here another approach that is more aligned with traditional lowcomplexity information reconciliation and privacy amplification algorithms. Note that the main challenge in the design of covert communication code is the extremely biased input distribution that achieves the covert capacity [8] . The main idea exploits our previous work on code design for covert communication over classical channels [13] , combining pulse position modulation (PPM) and multi-level coding (MLC), by which Alice and Bob can obtain a stationary sequence of quantum states over an effective block-length scaling as the square root of the actual block-length. This approach subsequently allows Alice and Bob to apply any QKD protocol to distill a key.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Alice and Bob aim at covertly expanding a secret key in the following manner. Let R A and R B be Alice's and Bob's local randomness, respectively, and let R be a secret common randomness. As depicted in Figure 1 , Alice has a transmitter in her lab to send quantum states to Bob. At any time instant, the state of the transmitter is described by a density operator on a Hilbert space H Q , and there exists a pure state |0 0| identifying the "idle" state of the transmitter, which is the state when there is no communication. Alice prepares a quantum state σ AQ n and sends σ Q n to Bob by n uses of her transmitter. The adversary Eve probes the communication, which is modeled by a memoryless quantum channel E Q→Q . Eve therefore obtains the output of E ⊗n Q→Q for the input σ Q n which interacts with an ancilla E n in Eve's lab before being transmitted to Bob. The whole operation can be described by an isometry U Q n →Q n E n , for which we denote the corresponding quantum channel by U Q n →Q n E n . We call this phase quantum state distribution, which leads to the joint quantum state σ AQ n E n (id A ⊗ U Q n →Q n E n • E ⊗n Q→Q )( σ AQ n ) between Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively. After establishing a shared quantum state, Alice and Bob interactively communicate over an authenticated classical channel and perform measurements on their available state to agree on keys S A and S B , respectively, belonging to 1, K . We call this phase quantum key distillation and formally describe it by a quantum channel E DSTL
, where C denotes all public communications. The final state would be then σ CS A S B E n (id E n ⊗ E DSTL
Furthermore, we assume that in the absence of the adversary, the "honest" channel from Alice to Bob is N Q→Q , and that they can abort the protocol at any time and not generate secret keys. For a particular protocol inducing the final joint state σ CS A S B E n , we assess the performance of the protocol with the following three quantities: 1) probability of error P(S A = S B |not abort), 2) information leakage D σ S A E n C ρ unif S A ⊗ σ E n C , 3) covertness D σ CE n ρ unif C ⊗ ρ 0 E n , and 4) robustness P(abort) in the presence of the honest channel N Q→Q . We highlight here three distinctions of our model from traditional QKD.
1. As covertness is of no interest in QKD, the idle state of the transmitter is not specified in a QKD model.
2. Unlike QKD, in which the quantum channel is in complete control of the adversary, we restrict Eve's observations to come from a probe E Q→Q . This assumption is necessary to establish covertness results [14, Theorem 1]; this implicitly assumes that all Eve's wiretapping strategies would have some imperfections. Although we assume that the quantum channel E Q→Q is known to Alice and Bob, we show in Section IV that a mild assumption on E Q→Q is enough to design a covert quantum key distribution protocol.
3. To ensure that public communication does not help Eve detect the communication, we impose two requirements: a) the public communication should be distributed according to a pre-specified distribution, which we choose to be the uniform distribution for simplicity; b) there should be a negligible dependence between public communications and σ E n .
III. HIGH LEVEL DESCRIPTION OF THE PROTOCOL
A. Two Unsuccessful Approaches Toward Covert QKD In [10, 14] , covertness is obtained through the transmission of information bearing qubits over a subset of channel uses, upon which Alice and Bob secretly agree prior to the communication. Let n be the total number of channel uses, and t be the number of channel uses over which transmission happens. To be covert and generate Ω( √ n) of secret key, we require that t = Θ( √ n), for which Alice and Bob need log n t = Θ( √ n log n) secret bits. Therefore, the required number of key bits needed in this protocol asymptotically dominates the number of generated bits. One alternative approach is to have Alice generate a binary sequence X n = (X 1 , · · · , X n ) i.i.d. with extremely biased distribution Bernoulli(α n ) and α n ∈ O(n − 1 2 ). Alice then modulates the signal by mapping zero to |0 and one to another state. After transmission, Alice and Bob could perform classical information reconciliation and privacy amplification to obtain a secret key from their shared quantum states. While this seems plausible at first sight, there is a subtlety that prevents Alice and Bob from generating O( √ n) bits for large n. Let X, Y , and E denote a single sub-system of Alice, Bob, and Eve. The asymptotic key rate is H(Y |E)−H(Y |X), but for finite n there is a penalty of the order of ω(n − 1 2 ) [15] , which dominates the asymptotic rate H(Y |E)−H(Y |X) = O(n − 1 2 ).
B. Covert QKD through PPM and MLC
The previous discussion suggests that another quantum state distribution is necessary for covert QKD. We here propose a scheme based on our prior work on the construction of practical codes for covert communication over classical channels [13] . Using the crucial ingredients of that coding scheme, PPM and MLC, we convert the problem of covert QKD to a traditional QKD problem over a smaller block-length scaling as O( √ n). In PPM, we split the whole transmission block into smaller sub-blocks and transmit exactly one non-zero state over each sub-block. The number of sub-blocks and the size of each sub-block should be O( √ n) to achieve covertness [16] . In addition, each position in a sub-block should be chosen uniformly at random, which introduces the symmetry that was lost in the sparse signaling approach. However, the size of the sub-blocks is growing with the block-length, which makes the security analysis of QKD difficult. We circumvent this issue by considering two parts for the randomness used to specify the pulse position: one part with a fixed size, used for key generation, and another part with growing size, used for mimicking the uniform distribution via quantum channel resolvability.
Alice and Bob to share R prior to the transmission. We now elaborate on the details of our proposed quantum state distribution protocol. We fix a pulse |1 which is a state of the transmitter such that supp (E(|1 1|)) ⊆ supp (E(|0 0|)). Let n = m = m x m v , where n is the block-length, is the number of sub-blocks, and m is the size of each sub-block. We call a sequence of independent |0 and |1 a PPM state if it has exactly one |1 in each sub-block. To determine the position of the pulse in each sub-block, we need log m bits, split into two parts of log m x and log m v bits. As depicted in Figure 2 , let X = (X 1 , · · · , X ) ∈ 1, m x and V = (V 1 , · · · , V ) ∈ 1, m v be two sequences, and let the pulse position in the i th sub-block be d(X i , V i ) (X i − 1)m v + V i . Alice generates X i.i.d. according to a uniform distribution over 1, m x . We can then define an effective cq-channel with classical input v and quantum output corresponding to Eve's observed state when X is uniformly distributed and V = v . Our goal is then to choose a code for this channel to induce a quantum state close to the quantum state when V is uniformly distributed. In other words, we need an encoder g : 1, H → 1, m v such that if R is uniformly distributed over 1, H and g(R) is given as the input of the effective cq-channel, the induced output quantum state resembles Eve's observed state when the input is chosen uniformly at random. This problem is known as quantum channel resolvability, and the minimum number of bits required log H is approximately equal to the Holevo information [17, Lemma 9.2]. Our calculations in Appendix A show that this Holevo information scales as O( /m x ). We allow Alice and Bob to share R prior to the transmission and subtract log H from the number of generated key bits. In each sub-block, Bob shall discard m − m x of his sub-systems that he knows the state |0 is sent from V = g(R). Therefore, for each sub-block Alice possesses classical state X i while Bob obtains m x received states, which we denote by σ X B . We show in Appendix A that, to achieve the optimal scaling in covert QKD, m x can be fixed with the block-length. The rest of the protocol would be similar to a traditional QKD protocol with an additional constraint that the public communication should be uniformly distributed and independent of Eve's observation during the quantum communication phase. For concreteness, we consider the general QKD protocol of [5] . Alice and Bob first permute their sub-systems according to a permutation chosen randomly and shared through the public communication. Bob then performs a measurement on his sub-systems and shares a small fraction of the outputs with Alice. To avoid compromising the covertness of the protocol, Bob one-time-pads the measurement outputs with a shared secret key. Alice then performs a parameter estimation phase and aborts the protocol if they cannot generate a key. We assume for simplicity that the protocol is aborted when the state is not close to the state obtained from the honest channel. In practice, Alice and Bob can apply more efficient parameter estimation protocols. If the protocol is not aborted, Bob and Alice perform information reconciliation and privacy amplification using two-universal hash functions as described in [5] .
C. Analysis
Suppose that Alice chooses a PPM state uniformly at random and ρ PPM Q n is the average state received by Eve.
In [11, Eq. (B144)], we have shown
. By a quantum channel resolvability result proved in Appendix A 1 c, there exists g such that if σ Q n denote the induced state at Eve σ Q n − ρ PPM (1) . Finally, by the data processing inequality for quantum relative entropy, whatever quantum operation Eve applies on her received state, the relative entropy between the induced state and the innocent state decreases. Thus, to have covertness δ, we should choose ≈ δχ 2 (ρ 1 Q ρ 0 Q )n. For the quantum key distillation part, we consider the equivalent entanglement-based version of the protocol, in which Alice prepares
for each sub-block and performs a measurement at the end. This helps us reduce Eve's information in a purification of the quantum state after the transmission. Note that if we use two-universal hash functions for information reconciliation, the size of public message is smaller than the key and therefore the left-over hash lemma implies that the public communication of this part also satisfies our covertness criterion. Finally, as detailed in Appendix A, the number of achievable bits is
, τ ABE is a purification of τ AB and τ XY E is the state obtained after measurement on A and B. We simplify the expression for the rate when Bob applies a measurement on each transmitted state Q. Let V Q→QE be an isometric extension of N Q→Q and de-
We show in Appendix A that
Therefore, by choosing m x large (but fixed with n) the number of generated key bits dominates the number of consumed bits in the first phase of the protocol, which is O( /m x ).
As an example, we illustrate in Figure 3 the number of achievable key bits when the honest channel is a bitflipping channel N Q→Q (ρ) = (1 − p)ρ + pXρX.
IV. DISCUSSION
We briefly discuss how to construct an efficient instantiation of the proposed protocol. For the quantum state distribution phase, a practical channel resolvability code is discussed in Appendix A. For the quantum key distillation phase, Alice and Bob can use any practical scheme for QKD. The polar coding technique introduced in [18] could be used for information reconciliation to make the public message look uniform. Finally, as Alice and Bob may not have precise knowledge of E Q→Q , by having a lower-bound on λ min (E Q→Q (|0 0|)), they can tune the ratio /m to control the covertness. For future work, one can consider a general signaling other than on-off-keying that we used throughout the paper. The extension of the results to infinite-dimensional case is also interesting for experimental purposes.
Appendix A: Formal Description and Analysis of the Proposed Protocol
We divide the protocol into two phases of quantum state distribution and quantum key distillation. In the first phase, Alice and Bob share quantum states which will be used for key distillation in the next phase. In particular, let n = m = m x m v . We prove the existence of a protocol, by which Alice and Bob share a state σ A B . The dimension of H A and H B depends only on m x , and the number of required key is O( /m x ). We bound D σ E n ρ 0 E n by m χ 2 (ρ 1 Q ρ 1 Q ) + o(1). Moreover, for the honest channel the state would be of the form σ A B = τ ⊗ AB where τ AB does not depend on .
Phase I: Covert Quantum State Distribution

a. Preliminaries of PPM
Let n = m for positive integers and m. We fix a unit vector |1 ∈ H Q such that |1 / ∈ span(|0 ) and supp(E Q→Q (|1 1|)) ⊆ supp(E Q→Q (|0 0|)). For z ∈ 1, m , we define the z th PPM states of length m as
We also define the classical-quantum state ρ PPM
Proof. 
In other words, ρ x,v Q m is the quantum state obtained by modulating (x, v) through PPM of length m. We also define the following quantum states
Let the -fold product of the above states be
We fix a function g : 1, H → V . Alice and Bob sample R uniformly at random from 1, H and set V g(R). Alice also draws X = (X 1 , · · · , X ) independently according to uniform distribution over X . Let P X V be the joint PMF of (X , V ). Alice prepares
and transmits subsystem Q n . Eve receives σ Q n through her probe E ⊗n Q→Q and applies U Q n →Q n E n . Eve then keeps E n and sends Q n to Bob. The quantum state after transmission would be
where Alice, Bob, and Eve have access to X V , V Q n , and E n , respectively. After receiving σ Q n , Bob uses his knowledge of V to discard the positions, in which Alice has definitely sent |0 . Formally, Bob applies the channel
This results in the quantum state σ X B
c. A Quantum Resolvability Result
We prove a quantum channel resolvability result based on privacy amplification result of [5] . Note that we cannot use the standard quantum resolvability result of [17] since it depends on the dimension of output space which grows exponentially for our specific channel. We first recall the definition of two-universal family of hash functions.
Definition 1. Let X and Z be two finite non-empty sets. A non-empty family of functions F from X to Z is called two-universal if for all distinct x, x ∈ X , we have
The next two results are well-known properties of twouniversal hash functions. Proposition 1. Let X and Z be two non-empty finite sets such that |X | is divisible by |Z|. There exits a twouniversal regular family of functions from X to Z.
Proposition 2 ( [5]
). Let ρ XA be a classical-quantum state on H X ⊗ H A with respect to an orthonormal basis {|x : x ∈ X } for H X , and F be a two-universal family of functions from X to Z. We then have
We are now ready to establish the main result of this section which shows the existence of a code controlling the statistics of a channel. The classical counter-part of this result was proved in [13] . There exists a function g : 1, H → X such that
Proof. Let us define Z 1, |X | H . By Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, there exists a function f : X → Z such that
and f −1 (z) = |X | |Z| = H for all z ∈ Z. By definition of E f X→Z and ρ XA , we have
(A20) Therefore, we have
Combining (A18) and (A21), we obtain that for z ∈ Z
where (a) follows from (A16). Taking a bijection g : 1, H → f −1 (z) completes the proof.
Although Lemma 2 does not provide an explicit resolvability encoder, Bob can always draw F and Z at random and sends them over the public channel to Alice. Using the same line of proof of Lemma 2, one can show that choosing an element of f −1 (Z) uniformly at random is still a channel resolvability code. In the next lemma, we show that under symmetry conditions on F and ρ XA the choice of z does not matter.
Lemma 3.
Suppose that for all f ∈ F, and z, z ∈ Z, there exists a bijection φ : X → X and unitary U over
We then have
Therefore, we obtain (A25).
d. Analysis
By Lemma 2, there exists a function g :
and |V| is divisible by H [19] . Let τ V Q m (id V ⊗ E ⊗m Q→Q )(ρ V Q m ). Applying [5, Corollary 3.3.7] , we simplify the condition on log K as
where (a) follows from the definition of the conditional smooth min-entropy [5, Definition 3.2.2], (b) follows from [5, Corollary 3.3.7] . We also further upper-bound
When m v is a power of a prime, we provide an example of two-universal hash functions satisfying the conditions of Lemma 3. For simplicity we assume that V = 0, m v − 1 . Note first that V is a field with component-wise addition modulo m v and a multiplication operation denoted by . We use the short-hand 0 m for the all-zero sequence of length m and ·|· for concatenation of two sequences. For k ∈ 1, and u ∈ V , let f u (v ) be the first k elements of u v . By [20] , F = f u : u ∈ V \ 0 is a regular two-universal class of hash functions. Moreover, for any u
show that φ satisfies (A23) and (A24). Note that
Furthermore, let U CS be the unitary operation on H ⊗m Q corresponding to cyclic shift of length 1, i.e., |φ 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |φ m → |φ m ⊗ |φ 1 ⊗ · · · |φ m−1 . By definition of d(x, v) and ρ v Q n , we have
where v + v is modulo m v . We therefore conclude (A24).
e. Entanglement-based Protocol
To make the security analysis simpler, we consider the equivalent entanglement-based quantum state distribution protocol described so far. For v ∈ V, let
When g(s) = v , Alice prepares σ A Q n = σ v1 AQ m ⊗ · · · ⊗ σ v AQ m and sends σ Q n . Alice performs a measurement on {|x : x ∈ X } to obtain classical information X at the end. Since local operations by Alice does not affect Eve's information, this is equivalent to applying the measurement at the beginning, which is the same as the protocol described before.
Phase II: Covert Quantum Key Distillation
In the second phase, Alice and Bob use local operations and classical communication (LOCC) to covertly distill a secret key from their shared quantum states in the first phase. The main result of this section is that the quantum key distillation protocol introduced in [5, Section 6] with a minor modification is covert. We consider the entanglement-based version of the quantum state distribution protocol, in which Alice and Bob share a state σ A B . Let τ AB be the state for the honest channel. For all ζ > 0, we show that there exist ξ > 0 and a sequence of covert quantum key distillation such that the probability of error is less than 2 −ξ , the probability of aborting the protocol on honest channel is at most 2 −ξ , the information leakage is at most 2 −ξ , and the covertness is at most
a. Random permutation of subsystems Bob picks a permutation π : 1, → 1, uniformly at random and sends π over the public channel. Alice and Bob subsequently apply π to their states. To analyze the obtained state after the permutation, we here recall basic definitions of symmetric subspaces and de Finetti theorem from [5] . Let S denote the set of all permutations on 1, . For a permutation π ∈ S , with slight abuse of notation, let π A denote the corresponding unitary acting on H ⊗ A . Let Sym H ⊗ A |ψ ∈ H ⊗ A : π A |ψ = |ψ . As in [5] , we also denote for |θ ∈ H A ,
We need the following results on symmetric subsystems. . Bob performs a measurement on each of his first 2 sub-systems and transmits the results onetime-padded with a secret key to Alice. Alice also measures her sub-system in {|x : x ∈ X } basis. Using the output of the measurement, Alice attempts to verify whether the honest channel has been used. Otherwise, she aborts the protocol. Lemma 6. For all ζ > 0, there exists a ξ > 0 such that for all , we can construct a parameter estimation protocol E PE A 1 + 2 B 1 + 2 E 1 + 2 →A 1 B 1 E 1 , which maps to zero operator if it aborts and does nothing otherwise, such that it does not abort for the honest channel with probability at least 1 − 2 −ξ 2 . Furthermore, for any θ such that F (tr AB (|θ θ|) , τ AB ) 1 − ζ, it aborts on ρ |θ with probability at least 2 −ξ 2 .
Let
Applying data processing inequality to (A53), we obtain that , triangle inequality implies that
By re-defining ξ, we ensure that
Bob performs measurement M = {M y } y∈Y on all his 1 sub-systems to obtain classical sequence Y 1 . Alice performs a measurement in {|x : x ∈ X } basis to obtain X 1 . Let P XY denote the PMF induced by measurement on the state τ AB , and M AB→XY denote the measurement channel. For |θ ABE ∈ Γ, by Uhlmann theorem, there exists a purification τ ABE of
Employing AFW inequality [21] , we obtain that
and similarly,
d. Information reconciliation
We explain an information reconciliation protocol from Bob to Alice, but one can modify the protocol for Alice to Bob direction. Let F 1 be a two-universal family of hash function from Y to 1, t 1 , where
for some ζ > 0. For some ξ > 0 determine later, let P X 1 Y 1 be a positive measure such that
H max (X 1 |Y 1 ) P . Bob samples F 1 uniformly at random form F 1 and transmits F 1 and F 1 (Y 1 ) over the public channel to Alice. Alice estimates
Otherwise, Alice aborts the protocol. By [5, Corollary 6.3.5], there exists ξ > 0 such that the probability that protocol is aborted on the honest channel is 2 −ξ 1 , and for any distribution on (X 1 , Y 1 ), the probability of error is at most 2 −ξ 1 .
e. Privacy amplification
We again only consider the Bob to Alice direction for privacy amplification. Let F 2 be a two-universal family of hash function from Y to 1, t 2 , where (1)).
We thus are able to apply privacy amplification and obtain that
Moreover, the size of public communication is log |C| = log + 2 log |Y| + log t 1 + log |F 1 | + log |F 2 | + 2. (A75)
In particular, there are choices of hash functions F 1 and calF 2 such that log |C| = O( log ).
Proof. By [5, Theorem 6.5.1], we have
Using triangle inequality and monotonicity of trace distance, we obtain that σ E n CS A − σ E n C ⊗ ρ S A 1 2 and ρ S A − ρ unif S A 1
. To obtain a bound on the relative entropy, we first recall two general inequality for quantum entropies. For two density operators ρ and σ over Hilbert space H such that suppρ ⊆ suppσ, we have
Furthermore, for a classical-quantum density operator ρ XA = x P X (x)|x x| X ⊗ ρ x A , we have
where (a) follows from Fannes inequality, and (b) follows from concavity of H b (·) and Jensen inequality. We are now ready to prove the lemma. Note that
(A83)
f. Rate Analysis
For forward and reverse public communication, the number of generated bits would be
respectively, where τ XY E is defined in Section A 2 c. When Bob performs measurement on each transmitted state separately, i.e., M B→Y = M ⊗m x Q→ Y for some measurement M ⊗m x Q→ Y on Q, we describe the asymptotic behavior of the generated number of bits for large m x in the following lemma. for i = 0, 1. We then have
Proof. Note first that
where ρ x
This implies that
Therefore, we have
Finally when ρ 0
which results in (A87).
This lemma shows that when
, by choosing m x large enough (but fixed with n), the rate of generated key dominates the rate of consumed key in the first phase, which is O( /m x ). However, when neither of these conditions are satisfied, we can still optimize Bob's measurement M B→Y to maximize
If the maximum value is larger than χ 2 rho 1 Q ρ 0 Q /m x , we obtain positive key generation rate.
g. Covertness analysis
Lemma 9 (Covertness). We have
where σ E n is Eve's state at the end of quantum state distribution phase.
Before proving the above lemma, we need the following two auxiliary results. The next lemma characterizes the covertness of a protocol consisting of several steps. Proposition 3. Let the quantum key distillation protocol takes place in r steps with public communications C = (C 1 , · · · , C r ). We then have
The next proposition states properties of one-time padded states. Let X 0, T − 1 for a positive integer T , and f : X × X → X be defined as (x, x ) → (x + x )modT . Proposition 4. Let ρ XA be a classical-quantum state and σ XA (E f XX→X ⊗ id A )(ρ unif X ⊗ ρ XA ), which can be obtained by adding (modulo T ) an independent uniformly distributed state to X subsystem of ρ XA . We then have σ XA = ρ unif X ⊗ ρ A . All public communications one-time padded with a shared secret key can be omitted from covertness analysis.
Lemma 9. By Proposition 3, we only need to upperbound D σ Ci ρ unif Ci +I(C i ; C 1 · · · C i−1 E n ) σ for each step of the protocol.
1. Since the permutation π is chosen uniformly at random and it is independent from other states, we have D σ C1 ρ unif C1 + I(C 1 ; E n ) σ = 0.
No public communication takes place in this step.
3. Proposition 4 implies that we can omit this step from the covertness analysis.
4. By the same argument as in [5, Theorem 6.5.1], we obtain that
Similar to the proof of Lemma 7, we can conclude that D σ F1F1(Y n ) ρ unif F1F1(Y n ) + I(F 1 F 1 (Y n ); E n ) σ (2 log (|C| dim H E n ) + log K) + H b ( ) + H b (2 ) .
(A100)
